Some people, demanding the secession of southern Yemen and the return of the situation to pre-1990, see that the separation represents a solution to get rid of the crises resulting from the continued unity between the two parts of Yemen, although the demands of separation appeared initially as a reaction on the exploitation of the unity by the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh and harness it in his advantage, after he transferred many of the southern civil and military employees to retire after the summer 1994 civil war, as well as looting of some of the lands of the south by him and his close associates, which were nationalized by the ruling regime in the south before the unity.

But the grievances caused by Ali Saleh and his regime to the southerners by using unity to his advantage ended after he left power under the pressure of the February 11, 2011 revolution and the political settlement of the Gulf Initiative and its executive mechanism. And this means the disappearance of all grievances because the first variable that came as a result of the February 11, 2011 revolution was to remove grievances suffered by the southerners at hands of Ali Saleh and his regime, and thus the disappearance of all the justifications that were represented a motive for the demands of separation.

Due to the new variables in the Yemeni political scene after the coup as well as the variables in the crisis of the region, we can certainly say that secession in an unsettled political environment is a key for new and unexpected crises that will cast a negative shadow over the two parts of the country. At the time most of the world opposes any separatist movements in the world for fear of its expansion and its impact on the stability of countries or territories in which there are separatist tendencies, and this was clearly demonstrated a few years before the regional and international rejection of separatist attempts adopted by the Kurds in Iraq and the region of Catalonia in Spain.

- The worst scenario

So far, there is no regional or international direction that calls for the secession of southern Yemen clearly. All influential countries in the Yemeni political scene have repeatedly stressed their support for Yemeni unity. Moreover, the demands of the secession of southern Yemen are not unanimously accepted by all the influential forces and groups in the southern governorates, most of whom support the idea of the federal territories with the continuity of unity in order to ensure the equitable distribution of power and wealth and the lack of dominance of a specific political or social group or else on power and wealth, whether in the event of the continuation of unity or return to secession.

However, this does not mean that the danger of secession is completely removed from Yemen and the region. There are southern groups that still raise the demands of secession and there are also forces that have armed militias and threaten to overthrow the legitimate authority and declare secession. Therefore, these groups do not mind receiving external support and implementing the agenda of their supporting countries and this happened at the beginning of the war on the coup in Aden, when some factions of the southern separatist movement colluded with the control of the Houthis against Aden. These factions were describing the war there as between northern forces that moved their battle to Aden and that the southerners did not enter in that war, knowing that these factions were still receiving support from Iran and acting according to what is demanded of them by the mullahs of Tehran. Separation itself is a great service for Iran, because separation comes in the context of its sabotage project in the region.

From the above, we conclude that secession remains the weakest and worst possible scenario at the same time. It is the weakest scenario because it does not enjoy local, regional and international consensus, and it is the worst scenario because of the new crises and serious security gaps consequent on it that will continue to bite the wall of the Gulf national security and the return of intra-regional conflicts inside each part that will be moved by historic retaliations. Thus, the emergence of chronic hotbeds of tension exhausts the two parts of Yemen and the neighboring countries in general, especially that the crises of the region are provoked by emerged and unusual political phenomena and cannot be reduced of their danger, such as wars by proxy, the emergence of sectarian and racial alliances across countries and nationalities, as well as the emergence of mobile terrorist groups that have an outstanding ability to hide, pervasion and growth in conflict areas, in addition to the disruption and transformation of international relations, the distrust between the Allies and the abandonment of the Alliance's requirements.

From the time of the ancient Yemeni kingdoms, passing through the Yemeni states that separated from the Umayyads and Abbasid Caliphate, then Ottoman Caliphate, and until the eve of the announcement of the re-establishment of Yemeni unity on May 22, 1990, most Yemeni crises and civil wars were caused by division and laceration and the lack of the establishment of one and strong central state that makes an end to the division, civil wars and the achievement of security, stability and well-being. Therefore, the return of secession in a turbulent local and regional political environment means the return of conflicts of the past in its worst form, due to external interference, specifically Iran, in order to sabotage and destroy its historical dream of revenge of the Arabs and destructing them in retaliation for the fact that they destroyed the Persian Empire in the era of Islamic conquests when it was at the height of its power and expansion.

- What will happen?

In the event that the south of Yemen divided, as ‎de facto, whether with or without external support, it will be the worst disaster to befall Yemen and the Gulf and Arab national security in general and in the most important vital region for the world as the main source of energy, which considers a main road for world trade, especially the oil trade, given the repercussions that will result from the separation, and here we will try to summarize it as follow:

- A political and social disturbance within the South because of the return of the historical revenges resulting from the tribal and regional conflicts that emerged as a result of the regime's failure to manage the state in the south before the unnty, the events of January 13, 1986, were the culmination of those conflicts, and the slogans of reconciliation and tolerance that began in 2007 did not succeed in filling up the psychological and social effects resulting from it to date.

- The secession will make the Houthis a great sectarian and social force in the north after they were a small group in the great and unified Yemen. This means that their role and dominance will be increased and that an entire country will be introduced to Iran on a plate of gold that Iran did not dream of and this country will be managed by the Houthis. With the passage of time, this country will become the most dangerous bomb threatening the entire Arab world, not just the Gulf States.

- Disruptions that will emerge in the north and in the south due to secession will result in the emergence of many conflicting groups as a result of the diminution of conflicts that have taken place throughout the great and unified Yemen. This means multiple gaps that will enable Iran to achieve serious breakthroughs in the Yemeni body and to attract and support several forces. And finally unite them under the banner of the Iranian project that threatens Yemen and neighboring countries in general, and turn the region into a field of blood and complex crises difficult to resolve and control the situation.

Inter-conflicts that emerged inside each part and every conflicts that will emerge between the two sides will drain all the resources of the two parts of the country because they are limited and cannot cover the costs of conflicts. This means that the foreign political money and the weapon that will be in the service of the supporting parties on the one hand and the high incidence of poverty and hunger on the other will be heavily expanded. This will provide a fertile environment for terrorist groups to control and spread, especially the Islamic State Organization, which is looking for alternative land, with difficult elevations, an absent and a divided state, poor and fragile society that cannot resist it, after successive defeats in Syria and Iraq.

Thus, the extent of the dangers posed by the secession of southern Yemen is clear if it happens. This is not an exaggeration, but an attempt to read past and present events and build expectations for them. A few years before the achievement of national unity, there were two wars, a serious crisis known as the events of the central regions, internal wars, crises within each section, the assassination of leaders and military coups. All these conflicts disappeared after the achievement of unity in 1990, and the conflicts that emerged after that were due to the mistakes of the regime only and the latest coup. With the demise of the former regime and the end of the coup, the stability of the unit will return. Returning to secession, pre-unity conflicts will revert to their worst forms and their effects will extend to the countries of the region in general.